Presidential Actions

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Revocation.  Sections 1, 3, 4, 5, and 7 of Executive Order 13961 of December 7, 2020 (Governance and Integration of Federal Mission Resilience), are hereby revoked.  Sections 2, 6, and 8 of Executive Order 13961 are renumbered as Sections 1, 2, and 3, respectively.  Section 1 of Executive Order 13961, as renumbered, is amended by striking the clause “To achieve this policy, in conjunction” and inserting in its place the words “In conjunction”.  Section 2(b) of Executive Order 13961, as renumbered, is amended by striking the clause “the Executive Committee established in section 3 of this order” and inserting in its place the words “the Restricted Principals Committee described in section 3 of the National Security Memorandum of January 19, 2025 (National Continuity Policy)”.

Sec. 2.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 19, 2025.

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By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Policy.  Well-designed programs that support local and Tribal leaders in left-behind communities can lead to stronger economic outcomes, strengthen regional assets, and reduce regional inequality.  It is the policy of my Administration to take a whole-of-government approach to defining, coordinating, and increasing the accessibility of existing and future programs that help left-behind communities.

Sec. 2.  Definitions.  For purposes of this order:

     (a)  The term “covered communities” means:

(i)    municipalities or other local areas within an economically distressed region;

(ii)   communities in Community Disaster Resiliency Zones;

(iii)  regions served by any of the following Federal programs:  the Energy Communities Interagency Working Group Priority Energy Communities, the Economic Development Administration Regional Technology and Innovation Hubs, the National Science Foundation Regional Innovation Engines, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Distressed Cities and Persistent Poverty Technical Assistance Program, or the Economic Development Administration Recompete Pilot Program; or

(iv)  rural communities identified by the Secretary of Agriculture and Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

     (b)  “Economically distressed region” means a region described by section 301 of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3161), section 29(j) of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 U.S.C. 3722b(j)(1)), or 49 U.S.C. 6702(a)(1), or that meets the definition of “persistent poverty county” in section 736 of Division A of Public Law 117-328.

(c)  “Implementing agencies” means the Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Small Business Administration.

(d)  “Place-based economic development” means policies and programs administered by the Federal Government that target defined regions, including Tribal lands, and use a coordinated approach that represents the interests of community members and community-based organizations in covered communities to:

(i)    improve physical infrastructure;

(ii)   support workforce development to fill locally and regionally demanded well-paying jobs;

(iii)  connect regions to new economic opportunities;

(iv)   increase the capacity of unions, labor organizations, community organizations, and the general public to negotiate legally binding agreements with investors, project developers, and companies to deliver locally defined benefits to local communities;

(v)    increase research and development capacity to accelerate local and regional innovation; or

(vi)   strengthen rural, Tribal and community systems.

Sec. 3.  Strengthening Federal Collaboration on Economic Development.  (a)  The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Assistant Secretary for Economic Development and in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, shall, where appropriate and consistent with applicable law, coordinate Federal investments with implementing agencies and develop and implement policy recommendations, including on meaningful community engagement, related to place-based economic development focused on covered communities.

(b)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, consistent with applicable law, including section 103 of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3133), the Secretary of Commerce, through the Assistant Secretary for Economic Development, shall work with implementing agencies to:

(i)    improve the quality, frequency, and accessibility of engagement with State, Tribal, territorial, local, and non-profit organizations in covered communities;

(ii)   support localized, community economic development that helps generate private investments that benefit left-behind communities, such as workforce training, resilient physical infrastructure, affordable energy, civic infrastructure, affordable housing, childcare, and transportation;

(iii)  develop an interagency technical assistance network in local geographies to enable interested communities and organizations to access information and resources from across the Federal Government through a single point of entry; and

(v)    identify geographies served by overlapping Federal place-based economic development programs to facilitate coordination of funding opportunities and post-award implementation, consistent with applicable law.

     (c)  Implementing agencies shall, to the extent appropriate and consistent with applicable law, include in forthcoming funding opportunities requirements, application evaluation factors, or incentives that provide a preference for applications from entities in and serving covered communities.

Sec. 4.  Supporting Award Access in Economically Distressed Regions.  (a)  Implementing agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, assist potential grant applicants, including in economically distressed regions, in understanding and applying for Federal grants.  Implementing agencies’ activities may include:

(i)    conducting proactive engagement with communities and organizations to promote opportunities for Federal assistance;

(ii)   providing guidance and technical assistance to applicants; and

(iii)  identifying resources across the agencies’ technical assistance programs and offices for support.

(b)  Within 1 year of the date of this order, implementing agencies shall, to the extent consistent with applicable law, consider signing a memorandum of agreement to exchange information, tools, and leading practices to ensure applicants to under-resourced programs are made aware of, and may be considered for, similar programs at other agencies.

Sec. 5.  Promoting Disaster Resilience and Long-Term Economic Development Post-Disaster.  In coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, implementing agencies that have field offices in economically distressed regions or Community Disaster Resilience Zones that have received a major disaster declaration within the past 3 years shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law:

(a)  seek input from local organizations on needs for and barriers to long-term economic resilience;

(b)  identify funding opportunities to address long-term economic development and infrastructure needs; and

(c)  provide targeted support for navigating the application process for funding opportunities.

     Sec. 6.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 19, 2025.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT:       Delegation of Authority to the Secretary of State to implement Fiscal Year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act Sections 5562(a)(2) and (3)

By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the authority to submit to Congress, after consultation with relevant departments and agencies, the reports required by sections 5562(a)(2) and (3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Public Law 117-263).

The delegation covered by this memorandum shall apply also with respect to any provision of any future public law that is the same or substantially the same as the provision referenced in this memorandum.

You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

               THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

               THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

              THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

              THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

SUBJECT:      Delegation of Certain Sanctions-Related

              Authorities

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including section 301 of Title 3, United States Code, I hereby order as follows:

     Section 1.  FEND Off Fentanyl Act.  (a) I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the functions and authorities vested in the President by sections 3102(a) and 3103 of the Fentanyl Eradication and Narcotics Deterrence Off Fentanyl Act (Division E of Pub. L. 118-50) (the “FEND Off Fentanyl Act”).

(b)  I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 3102(b) of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act.

(c)  I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 3104(b) of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act.

(d)  I hereby delegate to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of the Treasury, the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 3105(a)(2) of the FEND Off Fentanyl Act. 

     Sec. 2.  Other Matters.  (a)  I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 1(a) of Division G of Pub. L. 118-50.

     (b)  I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State, as appropriate, commensurate with existing delegations of authority for each provision of law listed in section 1(a)(2), in consultation, commensurate with such existing delegations of authority, with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Commerce, the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 1(b) of Division G of Pub. L. 118-50.     

     Sec. 3.  Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act of 2023.  (a)  I hereby delegate to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the functions and authorities vested in the President by section 1245(d)(5)(B) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (22 U.S.C. 8513a(d)(5)(B)), as amended by section 2 of the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act of 2023 (Division S of Pub. L. 118-50).

     Sec. 4.  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

                             JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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This action will strengthen the federal workforce and streamline the pathway into service for 23,000 trained AmeriCorps alumni annually

Today, President Biden signed an Executive Order allowing agencies to more quickly hire individuals who have completed an AmeriCorps program. This action honors the service of AmeriCorps members who have worked full-time to address the most pressing challenges facing communities across the country. It also strengthens our civil service by enabling streamlined hiring from a pool of skilled and qualified individuals with a proven commitment to national service.

This action follows a recommendation from the congressionally chartered and bipartisan National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service. At a time when only 8.7% of the federal workforce is under age 30, this Executive Order will make it easier for agencies to employ qualified and diverse young people with a strong commitment to service. It will also improve recruitment for AmeriCorps and increase the return on the federal government’s existing investment in recruiting and training AmeriCorps members.

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Dear Mr. Chairman:  (Dear Madam Chair:)

In accordance with section 508 of the Global Fragility Act of 2019 (GFA) (Title V of Div. J, P.L. 116-94), I am transmitting the Progress Report for implementing the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability in GFA priority countries (Haiti, Libya, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea) and the sub-region of Coastal West Africa (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo).

I am enclosing a copy of the unclassified Progress Report.  I am also enclosing the associated Annexes, which are for official use only and not for public distribution unless otherwise marked.

                              Sincerely,

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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This action will strengthen the federal workforce and streamline the pathway into service for 23,000 trained AmeriCorps alumni annually

Today, President Biden signed an Executive Order allowing agencies to more quickly hire individuals who have completed an AmeriCorps program. This action honors the service of AmeriCorps members who have worked full-time to address the most pressing challenges facing communities across the country. It also strengthens our civil service by enabling streamlined hiring from a pool of skilled and qualified individuals with a proven commitment to national service.

This action follows a recommendation from the congressionally chartered and bipartisan National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service. At a time when only 8.7% of the federal workforce is under age 30, this Executive Order will make it easier for agencies to employ qualified and diverse young people with a strong commitment to service. It will also improve recruitment for AmeriCorps and increase the return on the federal government’s existing investment in recruiting and training AmeriCorps members.

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     By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 3301 and 3302 of title 5, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

     Section 1.  Policy.  The Federal Government benefits from a workforce that can be recruited from the broadest and deepest pools of qualified candidates for merit-based positions.  The issuance of an order granting Non-Competitive Eligibility to certain alumni of programs administered by the Corporation for National and Community Service (operating as AmeriCorps) would be in the best interest of the Federal Government.  AmeriCorps alumni have demonstrated a sustained commitment to public service, have received extensive training and hands-on experience, and have developed leadership, communication, and technical skills that are aligned with the missions of many federal agencies and departments.  It is in the interest of the Federal Government to retain the services of these highly skilled individuals, particularly given that the Federal Government aided them in the acquisition of their skills.

      Accordingly, pursuant to my authority under 5 U.S.C. 3302(1), and in order to achieve a workforce that is drawn from all segments of society as provided in 5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(1), I find that conditions of good administration make necessary an exception to the competitive hiring rules for certain positions in the Federal civil service.

     Sec. 2.  Establishment.  The head of any executive department or agency may appoint noncompetitively any individual who is certified under section 3 of this order to a position in the competitive service for which the individual is qualified.

     Sec. 3.  Certifications.  (a)  The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of AmeriCorps, or the CEO’s designee, shall issue certificates to persons whom the CEO or designee deems to have satisfactorily completed:

(i)  a full-time term of national service of at least 1,700 hours as a Team Leader or Member, as specified in section 155(b)(1) or 155(b)(4) of the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12615(b)(1), 12615(b)(4)), or in the AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps program component specified in section 153 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 12613); or

(ii)  one or more terms of service that total at least 1,700 hours under section 139(b)(1) of that Act (42 U.S.C. 12593(b)(1)) as an AmeriCorps State and National participant under section 137 of that Act (42 U.S.C. 12591).

(b)  This order does not alter or otherwise affect the Non-Competitive Eligibility status for AmeriCorps Volunteers in Service to America participants, commonly known as VISTA members, who successfully complete their service, as described in section 415(d) of the Domestic Volunteer Service Act of 1973, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5055(d)). 

(c)  In making any certification under this section, the CEO, or the CEO’s designee, may rely on a confirmation made by the entity that selected the individual for, and supervised the individual in, the approved national service position in which such individual successfully completed a term of service, as specified in this section.  If AmeriCorps determines that the certification is incorrect, the Corporation shall, after considering the full facts and circumstances surrounding the incorrect certification, take appropriate action.

(d)  Any appointment under this order shall be effected within 1 year after completion of the appointee’s most recent term of service in the programs described in subsections (a)(i)-(ii) of this section.  Such period may be extended to not more than 3 years for persons who, following participation in the programs described in subsections (a)(i)-(ii) of this section, are engaged in an additional term of AmeriCorps service, in military service, in the pursuit of studies at an institution of higher learning, or in other activities that, in the view of the appointing authority, warrant an extension of such period.  Such period may also be extended to permit the adjudication of a background investigation.

(e)  Any law, Executive Order, or regulation that would disqualify an applicant for appointment in the competitive service shall also disqualify an applicant for appointment under this order.  Examples of disqualifying criteria include restrictions on employing persons who are not United States citizens or nationals; who have violated 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(7) and 3310 (the anti-nepotism provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978); who have knowingly and willfully failed to register for Selective Service when required to do so, 5 U.S.C. 3328(a)(2); who do not meet occupational qualifying standards prescribed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM); or who do not meet suitability factors prescribed by OPM.

Sec. 4.  Regulations.  The Director of OPM is authorized to issue such additional regulations as may be necessary to implement this order.  Any individual who meets the terms of this order, however, is eligible for noncompetitive hiring with or without additional regulations.

Sec. 5.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)  the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.


THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 16, 2025.

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By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1.  Policy.  Adversarial countries and criminals continue to conduct cyber campaigns targeting the United States and Americans, with the People’s Republic of China presenting the most active and persistent cyber threat to United States Government, private sector, and critical infrastructure networks.  These campaigns disrupt the delivery of critical services across the Nation, cost billions of dollars, and undermine Americans’ security and privacy.  More must be done to improve the Nation’s cybersecurity against these threats.

Building on the foundational steps I directed in Executive Order 14028 of May 12, 2021 (Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity), and the initiatives detailed in the National Cybersecurity Strategy, I am ordering additional actions to improve our Nation’s cybersecurity, focusing on defending our digital infrastructure, securing the services and capabilities most vital to the digital domain, and building our capability to address key threats, including those from the People’s Republic of China.  Improving accountability for software and cloud service providers, strengthening the security of Federal communications and identity management systems, and promoting innovative developments and the use of emerging technologies for cybersecurity across executive departments and agencies (agencies) and with the private sector are especially critical to improvement of the Nation’s cybersecurity.

Sec. 2.  Operationalizing Transparency and Security in Third-Party Software Supply Chains.  (a)  The Federal Government and our Nation’s critical infrastructure rely on software providers.  Yet insecure software remains a challenge for both providers and users and makes Federal Government and critical infrastructure systems vulnerable to malicious cyber incidents.  The Federal Government must continue to adopt secure software acquisition practices and take steps so that software providers use secure software development practices to reduce the number and severity of vulnerabilities in software they produce.   

(b)  Executive Order 14028 directed actions to improve the security and integrity of software critical to the Federal Government’s ability to function.  Executive Order 14028 directed the development of guidance on secure software development practices and on generating and providing evidence in the form of artifacts — computer records or data that are generated manually or by automated means — that demonstrate compliance with those practices.  Additionally, it directed the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to require agencies to use only software from providers that attest to using those secure software development practices.  In some instances, providers of software to the Federal Government commit to following cybersecurity practices, yet do not fix well-known exploitable vulnerabilities in their software, which puts the Government at risk of compromise.  The Federal Government needs to adopt more rigorous third-party risk management practices and greater assurance that software providers that support critical Government services are following the practices to which they attest.

(i)    Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), shall recommend to the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (FAR Council) contract language requiring software providers to submit to CISA through CISA’s Repository for Software Attestation and Artifacts (RSAA):

(A)  machine-readable secure software development attestations;

(B)  high-level artifacts to validate those attestations; and

(C)  a list of the providers’ Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agency software customers. 

(ii)   Within 120 days of the receipt of the recommendations described in subsection (b)(i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the recommendations and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of General Services, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (the agency members of the FAR Council) shall jointly take steps to amend the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) to implement those recommendations.  The agency members of the FAR Council are strongly encouraged to consider issuing an interim final rule, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.

(iii)  Within 60 days of the date of the issuance of the recommendations described in subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall evaluate emerging methods of generating, receiving, and verifying machine-readable secure software development attestations and artifacts and, as appropriate, shall provide guidance for software providers on submitting them to CISA’s RSAA website, including a common data schema and format.

(iv)   Within 30 days of the date of any amendments to the FAR described in subsection (b)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall develop a program to centrally verify the completeness of all attestation forms.  CISA shall continuously validate a sample of the complete attestations using high-level artifacts in the RSAA.

(v)    If CISA finds that attestations are incomplete or artifacts are insufficient for validating the attestations, the Director of CISA shall notify the software provider and the contracting agency.  The Director of CISA shall provide a process for the software provider to respond to CISA’s initial determination and shall duly consider the response. 

(vi)   For attestations that undergo validation, the Director of CISA shall inform the National Cyber Director, who shall publicly post the results, identifying the software providers and software version.  The National Cyber Director is encouraged to refer attestations that fail validation to the Attorney General for action as appropriate.

(c)  Secure software development practices are not sufficient to address the potential for cyber incidents from resourced and determined nation-state actors.  To mitigate the risk of such incidents occurring, software providers must also address how software is delivered and the security of the software itself.  The Federal Government must identify a coordinated set of practical and effective security practices to require when it procures software.

(i)    Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall establish a consortium with industry at the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence to develop guidance, informed by the consortium as appropriate, that demonstrates the implementation of secure software development, security, and operations practices based on NIST Special Publication 800-218 (Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF)).

(ii)   Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall update NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations) to provide guidance on how to securely and reliably deploy patches and updates. 

(iii)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the heads of such agencies as the Director of NIST deems appropriate, shall develop and publish a preliminary update to the SSDF.  This update shall include practices, procedures, controls, and implementation examples regarding the secure and reliable development and delivery of software as well as the security of the software itself.  Within 120 days of publishing the preliminary update, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall publish a final version of the updated SSDF.

(iv)   Within 120 days of the final update to the SSDF described in subsection (c)(iii) of this section, the Director of OMB shall incorporate select practices for the secure development and delivery of software contained in NIST’s updated SSDF into the requirements of OMB Memorandum M-22-18 (Enhancing the Security of the Software Supply Chain through Secure Software Development Practices) or related requirements.

(v)    Within 30 days of the issuance of OMB’s updated requirements described in subsection (c)(iv) of this section, the Director of CISA shall prepare any revisions to CISA’s common form for Secure Software Development Attestation to conform to OMB’s requirements and shall initiate any process required to obtain clearance of the revised form under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

(d)  As agencies have improved their cyber defenses, adversaries have targeted the weak links in agency supply chains and the products and services upon which the Federal Government relies.  Agencies need to integrate cybersecurity supply chain risk management programs into enterprise-wide risk management activities.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, the Administrator of General Services, and the Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC), shall take steps to require, as the Director deems appropriate, that agencies comply with the guidance in NIST Special Publication 800-161 (Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations (SP 800-161 Revision 1)).  OMB shall require agencies to provide annual updates to OMB as they complete implementation.  Consistent with SP 800-161 Revision 1, OMB’s requirements shall address the integration of cybersecurity into the acquisition lifecycle through acquisition planning, source selection, responsibility determination, security compliance evaluation, contract administration, and performance evaluation.

(e)  Open source software plays a critical role in Federal information systems.  To help the Federal Government continue to reap the innovation and cost benefits of open source software and contribute to the cybersecurity of the open source software ecosystem, agencies must better manage their use of open source software.  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, and the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services and the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall jointly issue recommendations to agencies on the use of security assessments and patching of open source software and best practices for contributing to open source software projects.

Sec. 3.  Improving the Cybersecurity of Federal Systems.  (a)  The Federal Government must adopt proven security practices from industry — to include in identity and access management — in order to improve visibility of security threats across networks and strengthen cloud security. 

(b)  To prioritize investments in the innovative identity technologies and processes of the future and phishing-resistant authentication options, FCEB agencies shall begin using, in pilot deployments or in larger deployments as appropriate, commercial phishing-resistant standards such as WebAuthn, building on the deployments that OMB and CISA have developed and established since the issuance of Executive Order 14028.  These pilot deployments shall be used to inform future directions for Federal identity, credentialing, and access management strategies.

(c)  The Federal Government must maintain the ability to rapidly and effectively identify threats across the Federal enterprise.  In Executive Order 14028, I directed the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish procedures to immediately share threat information to strengthen the collective defense of Department of Defense and civilian networks.  To enable identification of threat activity, CISA’s capability to hunt for and identify threats across FCEB agencies under 44 U.S.C. 3553(b)(7) must be strengthened.

(i)     The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, in coordination with the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council and Federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Council, shall develop the technical capability to gain timely access to required data from FCEB agency endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions and from FCEB agency security operation centers to enable:

(A)  timely hunting and identification of novel cyber threats and vulnerabilities across the Federal civilian enterprise;

(B)  identification of coordinated cyber campaigns that simultaneously target multiple agencies and move laterally across the Federal enterprise; and

(C)  coordination of Government-wide efforts on information security policies and practices, including compilation and analysis of information about incidents that threaten information security.

(ii)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, in coordination with the Federal CIO and CISO Councils, shall develop and release a concept of operations that enables CISA to gain timely access to required data to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(i) of this section.  The Director of OMB shall oversee the development of this concept of operations to account for agency perspectives and the objectives outlined in this section and shall approve the final concept of operations.  This concept of operations shall include:

(A)  requirements for FCEB agencies to provide CISA with data of sufficient completeness and on the timeline required to enable CISA to achieve the objectives described in subsection (c)(i) of this section;

(B)  requirements for CISA to provide FCEB agencies with advanced notification when CISA directly accesses agency EDR solutions to obtain required telemetry;

(C)  specific use cases for which agencies may provide telemetry data subject to the requirements in subsection (c)(ii)(A) of this section as opposed to direct access to EDR solutions by CISA;

(D)  high-level technical and policy control requirements to govern CISA access to agency EDR solutions that conform with widely accepted cybersecurity principles, including role-based access controls, “least privilege,” and separation of duties;

(E)  specific protections for highly sensitive agency data that is subject to statutory, regulatory, or judicial restrictions to protect confidentiality or integrity; and

(F)  an appendix to the concept of operations that identifies and addresses certain types of specific use cases under subsection (c)(ii)(C) of this section that apply to the Department of Justice, including certain categories of information described in subsections (c)(vi) and (c)(vii) of this section, and requires the Department of Justice’s concurrence on the terms of the appendix prior to implementation of the concept of operations on the Department of Justice’s or its subcomponents’ networks.

(iii)   In undertaking the activities described in subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall only make a change to an agency network, system, or data when such change is required for threat hunting by CISA, including access to the EDR tools described in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, or in furtherance of its authority to conduct threat hunting as authorized under 44 U.S.C. 3553(b)(7), unless otherwise authorized by the agency.

(iv)    Within 30 days of the release of the concept of operations described in subsection (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall establish working groups, open to all agencies, to develop and release specific technical controls that achieve the objectives set forth in subsection (c)(ii) of this section and to work with EDR solution providers to implement those controls in FCEB agency deployments of EDR solutions.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall, at a minimum, establish a working group for each EDR solution authorized by CISA for use in the CISA Continuous Diagnostic and Mitigation Program.  Each working group shall be open to all agencies and include at least one representative from an FCEB agency employing the designated EDR solution.

(v)     Within 180 days of the release of the technical controls described in subsection (c)(iv) of this section, the heads of FCEB agencies shall enroll endpoints using an EDR solution covered by those controls in the CISA Persistent Access Capability program.

(vi)    Within 90 days of the date of this order, and periodically thereafter as needed, the heads of FCEB agencies shall provide to CISA a list of systems, endpoints, and data sets that require additional controls or periods of non-disruption to ensure that CISA’s threat-hunting activities do not disrupt mission-critical operations, along with an explanation of those operations.

(vii)   In cases in which agency data is subject to statutory, regulatory, or judicial access restrictions, the Director of CISA shall comply with agency processes and procedures required to access such data or work with the agency to develop an appropriate administrative accommodation consistent with any such restrictions so that the data is not subject to unauthorized access or use.

(viii)  Nothing in this order requires an agency to provide access to information that is protected from non-disclosure by court order or otherwise required to be kept confidential in connection with a judicial proceeding.

(d)  The security of Federal information systems relies on the security of the Government’s cloud services.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Administrator of General Services, acting through the Director of the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP), in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall develop FedRAMP policies and practices to incentivize or require cloud service providers in the FedRAMP Marketplace to produce baselines with specifications and recommendations for agency configuration of agency cloud-based systems in order to secure Federal data based on agency requirements.

(e)  As cybersecurity threats to space systems increase, these systems and their supporting digital infrastructure must be designed to adapt to evolving cybersecurity threats and operate in contested environments.  In light of the pivotal role space systems play in global critical infrastructure and communications resilience, and to further protect space systems and the supporting digital infrastructure vital to our national security, including our economic security, agencies shall take steps to continually verify that Federal space systems have the requisite cybersecurity capabilities through actions including continuous assessments, testing, exercises, and modeling and simulation.

(i)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Director of the United States Geological Survey; the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere and the Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall each review the civil space contract requirements in the FAR and recommend to the FAR Council and other appropriate agencies updates to civil space cybersecurity requirements and relevant contract language.  The recommended cybersecurity requirements and contract language shall use a risk-based, tiered approach for all new civil space systems.  Such requirements shall be designed to apply at minimum to the civil space systems’ on-orbit segments and link segments.  The requirements shall address the following elements for the highest-risk tier and, as appropriate, other tiers:

(A)  protection of command and control of the civil space system, including backup or failover systems, by:

(1)  encrypting commands to protect the confidentiality of communications;

(2)  ensuring commands are not modified in transit;

(3)  ensuring an authorized party is the source of commands; and

(4)  rejecting unauthorized command and control attempts;

(B)  establishment of methods to detect, report, and recover from anomalous network or system activity; and

(C)  use of secure software and hardware development practices, consistent with the NIST SSDF or any successor documents.

(ii)   Within 180 days of receiving the recommended contract language described in subsection (e)(i) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the proposal and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, the agency members of the FAR Council shall jointly take steps to amend the FAR.

(iii)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the National Cyber Director shall submit to OMB a study of space ground systems owned, managed, or operated by FCEB agencies.  This study shall include:

(A)  an inventory of space ground systems;

(B)  whether each space ground system is classified as a major information system under 44 U.S.C. 3505(c), labeled “Inventory of major information systems”; and

(C)  recommendations to improve the cyber defenses and oversight of such space ground systems.

(iv)   Within 90 days of the submission of the study described in subsection (e)(iii) of this section, the Director of OMB shall take appropriate steps to help ensure that space ground systems owned, managed, or operated by FCEB agencies comply with relevant cybersecurity requirements issued by OMB.

Sec. 4.  Securing Federal Communications.  (a)  To improve the security of Federal Government communications against adversarial nations and criminals, the Federal Government must implement, to the extent practicable and consistent with mission needs, strong identity authentication and encryption using modern, standardized, and commercially available algorithms and protocols.

(b)  The security of Internet traffic depends on data being correctly routed and delivered to the intended recipient network.  Routing information originated and propagated across the Internet, utilizing the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is vulnerable to attack and misconfiguration.

(i)    Within 90 days of the date of this order, FCEB agencies shall take steps to ensure that all of their assigned Internet number resources (Internet Protocol (IP) address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers) are covered by a Registration Services Agreement with the American Registry for Internet Numbers or another appropriate regional Internet registry.  Thereafter, FCEB agencies shall annually review and update in their regional Internet registry accounts organizational identifiers related to assigned number resources such as organization names, points of contact, and associated email addresses.

(ii)   Within 120 days of the date of this order, all FCEB agencies that hold IP address blocks shall create and publish Route Origin Authorizations in the public Resource Public Key Infrastructure repository hosted or delegated by the American Registry for Internet Numbers or the appropriate regional Internet registry for the IP address blocks they hold.

(iii)  Within 120 days of the date of this order, the National Cyber Director, in coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall      recommend contract language to the FAR Council to require contracted providers of Internet services to agencies to adopt and deploy Internet routing security technologies, including publishing Route Origin Authorizations and performing Route Origin Validation filtering.  The recommended language shall include requirements or exceptions, as appropriate, for agency contracts regarding overseas operations and overseas local service providers.  Within 270 days of receiving these recommendations, the FAR Council shall review the recommended contract language and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, the agency members of the FAR Council shall jointly take steps to amend the FAR.  Pending any such amendments to the FAR, individual agencies are encouraged to include such requirements in future contracts, consistent with applicable law.

(iv)   Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall publish updated guidance to agencies on deployment of current, operationally viable BGP security methods for Federal Government networks and service providers.  The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall also provide updated guidance on other emerging technologies to improve Internet routing security and resilience, such as route leak mitigation and source address validation.

(c)  Encrypting Domain Name System (DNS) traffic in transit is a critical step to protecting both the confidentiality of the information being transmitted to, and the integrity of the communication with, the DNS resolver.

(i)   Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall publish template contract language requiring that any product that acts as a DNS resolver (whether client or server) for the Federal Government support encrypted DNS and shall recommend that language to the FAR Council.  Within 120 days of receiving the recommended language, the FAR Council shall review it, and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, the agency members of the FAR Council shall jointly take steps to amend the FAR.

(ii)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, FCEB agencies shall enable encrypted DNS protocols wherever their existing clients and servers support those protocols.  FCEB agencies shall also enable such protocols within 180 days of any additional clients and servers supporting such protocols.

(d)  The Federal Government must encrypt email messages in transport and, where practical, use end-to-end encryption in order to protect messages from compromise.

(i)    Within 120 days of the date of this order, each FCEB agency shall technically enforce encrypted and authenticated transport for all connections between the agency’s email clients and their associated email servers.

(ii)   Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB shall establish a requirement for expanded use of authenticated transport-layer encryption between email servers used by FCEB agencies to send and receive email.

(iii)  Within 90 days of the establishment of the requirement described in subsection (d)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall take appropriate steps to assist agencies in meeting that requirement, including by issuing implementing directives, as well as technical guidance to address any identified capability gaps.

(e)  Modern communications such as voice and video conferencing and instant messaging are usually encrypted at the link level but often are not encrypted end-to-end.  Within 180 days of the date of this order, to advance the security of Internet-based voice and video conferencing and instant messaging, the Director of OMB, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA; the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Archivist of the United States, acting through the Chief Records Officer for the United States Government; and the Administrator of General Services shall take appropriate steps to require agencies to:

(i)   enable transport encryption by default; and

(ii)  where technically supported, use end-to-end encryption by default while maintaining logging and archival capabilities that allow agencies to fulfill records management and accountability requirements.

(f)  Alongside their benefits, quantum computers pose significant risk to the national security, including the economic security, of the United States.  Most notably, a quantum computer of sufficient size and sophistication — also known as a cryptanalytically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) — will be capable of breaking much of the public-key cryptography used on digital systems across the United States and around the world.  In National Security Memorandum 10 of May 4, 2022 (Promoting United States Leadership in Quantum Computing While Mitigating Risks to Vulnerable Cryptographic Systems), I directed the Federal Government to prepare for a transition to cryptographic algorithms that would not be vulnerable to a CRQC. 

(i)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall release and thereafter regularly update a list of product categories in which products that support post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are widely available.

(ii)   Within 90 days of a product category being placed on the list described in subsection (f)(i) of this section, agencies shall take steps to include in any solicitations for products in that category a requirement that products support PQC.

(iii)  Agencies shall implement PQC key establishment or hybrid key establishment including a PQC algorithm as soon as practicable upon support being provided by network security products and services already deployed in their network architectures.

(iv)   Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST and the Under Secretary for International Trade, shall identify and engage foreign governments and industry groups in key countries to encourage their transition to PQC algorithms standardized by NIST.

(v)    Within 180 days of the date of this order, to prepare for transition to PQC, the Secretary of Defense with respect to National Security Systems (NSS), and the Director of OMB with respect to non-NSS, shall each issue requirements for agencies to support, as soon as practicable, but not later than January 2, 2030, Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 or a successor version.

(g)  The Federal Government should take advantage of commercial security technologies and architectures, such as hardware security modules, trusted execution environments, and other isolation technologies, to protect and audit access to cryptographic keys with extended lifecycles.

(i)    Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, and the Administrator of General Services shall develop guidelines for the secure management of access tokens and cryptographic keys used by cloud service providers.

(ii)   Within 60 days of the publication of the guidelines described in subsection (g)(i) of this section, the Administrator of General Services, acting through the FedRAMP Director, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA, shall develop updated FedRAMP requirements, incorporating the guidelines described in subsection (g)(i) of this section, as appropriate and consistent with guidance issued by the Director of OMB, concerning cryptographic key management security practices.

(iii)  Within 60 days of the publication of the guidelines described in subsection (g)(i) of this section, the Director of OMB, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA; and the Administrator of General Services shall take appropriate steps to require FCEB agencies to follow best practices concerning the protection and management of hardware security modules, trusted execution environments, or other isolation technologies for access tokens and cryptographic keys used by cloud service providers in the provision of services to agencies.

Sec. 5.  Solutions to Combat Cybercrime and Fraud.  (a)  The use of stolen and synthetic identities by criminal syndicates to systemically defraud public benefits programs costs taxpayers and wastes Federal Government funds.  To help address these crimes it is the policy of the executive branch to strongly encourage the acceptance of digital identity documents to access public benefits programs that require identity verification, so long as it is done in a manner that preserves broad program access for vulnerable populations and supports the principles of privacy, data minimization, and interoperability. 

(i)    Within 90 days of the date of this order, agencies with grantmaking authority are encouraged to consider, in coordination with OMB and the National Security Council staff, whether Federal grant funding is available to assist States in developing and issuing mobile driver’s licenses that achieve the policies and principles described in this section.

(ii)   Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall issue practical implementation guidance, in collaboration with relevant agencies and other stakeholders through the National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence, to support remote digital identity verification using digital identity documents that will help issuers and verifiers of digital identity documents advance the policies and principles described in this section.

(iii)  Agencies should consider accepting digital identity documents as digital identity verification evidence to access public benefits programs, but only if the use of these documents is consistent with the policies and principles described in this section.

(iv)   Agencies should, consistent with applicable law, seek to ensure that digital identity documents accepted as digital identity verification evidence to access public benefits programs:

(A)   are interoperable with relevant standards and trust frameworks, so that the public can use any standards-compliant hardware or software containing an official Government-issued digital identity document, regardless of manufacturer or developer;
(B)  do not enable authorities that issue digital identity documents, device manufacturers, or any other third party to surveil or track presentation of the digital identity document, including user device location at the time of presentation; and
(C)  support user privacy and data minimization by ensuring only the minimum information required for a transaction — often a “yes” or “no” response to a question, such as whether an individual is older than a specific age — is requested from the holder of the digital identity document.

(b)  The use of “Yes/No” validation services, also referred to as attribute validation services, can enable more privacy-preserving means to reduce identity fraud.  These services allow programs to confirm, via a privacy-preserving “yes” or “no” response, that applicant-provided identity information is consistent with information already contained in official records, without needing to share the contents of those official records.  To support the use of such services, the Commissioner of Social Security, and the head of any other agency designated by the Director of OMB, shall, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, consider taking steps to develop or modify services — including through, as appropriate, the initiation of a proposed rulemaking or the publication of a notice of a new or significantly modified routine use of records — related to Government-operated identity verification systems and public benefits programs, with consideration given to having such systems and programs submit applicant-provided identity information to the agency providing the service and receive a “yes” or “no” response as to whether the applicant-provided identity information is consistent with the information on file with the agency providing the service.  In doing so, the heads of these agencies shall specifically consider seeking to ensure, consistent with applicable law, that:

(i)    any applicant-provided identity information submitted to the services and any “yes” or “no” response provided by the services are used only to assist with identity verification, program administration, anti-fraud operations, or investigation and prosecution of fraud related to the public benefits program for which the identity information was submitted;
(ii)   the services are made available, to the maximum extent permissible and as appropriate, to public benefits programs; Government-operated identity verification systems, including shared-service providers; payment integrity programs; and United States-regulated financial institutions; and

(iii)  the agencies, public benefits programs, or institutions using the services provide reimbursement to appropriately cover costs and support the ongoing maintenance, improvement, and broad accessibility of the services.

     (c)  The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Administrator of General Services, shall research, develop, and conduct a pilot program for technology that notifies individuals and entities when their identity information is used to request a payment from a public benefits program, gives individuals and entities the option to stop potentially fraudulent transactions before they occur, and reports fraudulent transactions to law enforcement entities.

Sec. 6.  Promoting Security with and in Artificial Intelligence.  Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to transform cyber defense by rapidly identifying new vulnerabilities, increasing the scale of threat detection techniques, and automating cyber defense.  The Federal Government must accelerate the development and deployment of AI, explore ways to improve the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure using AI, and accelerate research at the intersection of AI and cybersecurity.

(a)  Within 180 days of the date of the completion of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 2025 Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge, the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall launch a pilot program, involving collaboration with private sector critical infrastructure entities as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, on the use of AI to enhance cyber defense of critical infrastructure in the energy sector, and conduct an assessment of the pilot program upon its completion.  This pilot program, and accompanying assessment, may include vulnerability detection, automatic patch management, and the identification and categorization of anomalous and malicious activity across information technology (IT) or operational technology systems.

(b)  Within 270 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense shall establish a program to use advanced AI models for cyber defense. 

(c)  Within 150 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology; and the Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) shall each prioritize funding for their respective programs that encourage the development of large-scale, labeled datasets needed to make progress on cyber defense research, and ensure that existing datasets for cyber defense research have been made accessible to the broader academic research community (either securely or publicly) to the maximum extent feasible, in consideration of business confidentiality and national security.

(d)  Within 150 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Energy; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Science and Technology; and the Director of the NSF shall prioritize research on the following topics:

(i)    human-AI interaction methods to assist defensive cyber analysis;

(ii)   security of AI coding assistance, including security of AI-generated code;

(iii)  methods for designing secure AI systems; and

(iv)   methods for prevention, response, remediation, and recovery of cyber incidents involving AI systems.

(e)  Within 150 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Director of OMB, shall incorporate management of AI software vulnerabilities and compromises into their respective agencies’ existing processes and interagency coordination mechanisms for vulnerability management, including through incident tracking, response, and reporting, and by sharing indicators of compromise for AI systems.

Sec. 7.  Aligning Policy to Practice.  (a)  IT infrastructure and networks that support agencies’ critical missions need to be modernized.  Agencies’ policies must align investments and priorities to improve network visibility and security controls to reduce cyber risks.

(i)   Within 3 years of the date of this order, the Director of OMB shall issue guidance, including any necessary revision to OMB Circular A-130, to address critical risks and adapt modern practices and architectures across Federal information systems and networks.  This guidance shall, at a minimum:

(A)  outline expectations for agency cybersecurity information sharing and exchange, enterprise visibility, and accountability for enterprise-wide cybersecurity programs by agency CISOs;

(B)  revise OMB Circular A-130 to be less technically prescriptive in key areas, where appropriate, to more clearly promote the adoption of evolving cybersecurity best practices across Federal systems, and to include migration to zero trust architectures and implementation of critical elements such as EDR capabilities, encryption, network segmentation, and phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication; and

(C)  address how agencies should identify, assess, respond to, and mitigate risks to mission essential functions presented by concentration of IT vendors and services.

(ii)  The Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST; the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Director of CISA; and the Director of OMB shall establish a pilot program of a rules-as-code approach for machine-readable versions of policy and guidance that OMB, NIST, and CISA publish and manage regarding cybersecurity.

(b)  Managing cybersecurity risks is now a part of everyday industry practice and should be expected for all types of businesses.  Minimum cybersecurity requirements can make it costlier and harder for threat actors to compromise networks.  Within 240 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall evaluate common cybersecurity practices and security control outcomes that are commonly used or recommended across industry sectors, international standards bodies, and other risk management programs, and based on that evaluation issue guidance identifying minimum cybersecurity practices.  In developing this guidance, the Secretary of Commerce, acting through the Director of NIST, shall solicit input from the Federal Government, the private sector, academia, and other appropriate actors.

(c)  Agencies face multiple cybersecurity risks when purchasing products and services.  While agencies have already made significant advances to improve their supply chain risk management, additional actions are needed to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape.  Within 180 days of the issuance of the guidance described in subsection (b) of this section, the FAR Council shall review the guidance and, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, the agency members of the FAR Council shall jointly take steps to amend the FAR to:

(i)   require that contractors with the Federal Government follow applicable minimum cybersecurity practices identified in NIST’s guidance pursuant to subsection (b) of this section with respect to work performed under agency contracts or when developing, maintaining, or supporting IT services or products that are provided to the Federal Government; and

(ii)  adopt requirements for agencies to, by January 4, 2027, require vendors to the Federal Government of consumer Internet-of-Things products, as defined by 47 C.F.R. 8.203(b), to carry United States Cyber Trust Mark labeling for those products.

Sec. 8.  National Security Systems and Debilitating Impact Systems.  (a)  Except as specifically provided for in section 4(f)(v) of this order, sections 1 through 7 of this order shall not apply to Federal information systems that are NSS or are otherwise identified by the Department of Defense or the Intelligence Community as debilitating impact systems.

(b)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, to help ensure that NSS and debilitating impact systems are protected with the most advanced security measures, the Secretary of Defense, acting through the Director of NSA as the National Manager for National Security Systems (National Manager), in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence and the Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS), and in consultation with the Director of OMB and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), shall develop requirements for NSS and debilitating impact systems that are consistent with the requirements set forth in this order, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.  The Secretary of Defense may grant exceptions to such requirements in circumstances necessitated by unique mission needs.  Such requirements shall be incorporated into a proposed National Security Memorandum, to be submitted to the President through the APNSA. 

(c)  To help protect space NSS with cybersecurity measures that keep pace with emerging threats, within 210 days of the date of this order, the CNSS shall review and update, as appropriate, relevant policies and guidance regarding space system cybersecurity.  In addition to appropriate updates, the CNSS shall identify and address appropriate requirements to implement cyber defenses on Federal Government-procured space NSS in the areas of intrusion detection, use of hardware roots of trust for secure booting, and development and deployment of security patches.

(d)  To enhance the effective governance and oversight of Federal information systems, within 90 days of the date of this order, the Director of OMB shall issue guidance as appropriate requiring agencies to inventory all major information systems and provide the inventory to CISA, the Department of Defense, or the National Manager, as applicable, which shall each maintain a registry of agency inventories within their purview.  CISA, the Department of Defense CIO, and the National Manager will share their inventories as appropriate to identify gaps or overlaps in oversight coverage.  This guidance shall not apply to elements of the Intelligence Community.

(e)  Nothing in this order alters the authorities and responsibilities granted in law or policy to the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Manager over applicable systems pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 80–253), the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-283), National Security Directive 42 of July 5, 1990 (National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems), or National Security Memorandum 8 of January 19, 2022 (Improving the Cybersecurity of National Security, Department of Defense, and Intelligence Community Systems).

Sec. 9.  Additional Steps to Combat Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities.  Because I find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency with respect to significant malicious cyber-enabled activities declared in Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015 (Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), as amended by Executive Order 13757 of December 28, 2016 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), and further amended by Executive Order 13984 of January 19, 2021 (Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities), to protect against the growing and evolving threat of malicious cyber-enabled activities against the United States and United States allies and partners, including the increasing threats by foreign actors of unauthorized access to critical infrastructure, ransomware, and cyber-enabled intrusions and sanctions evasion, I hereby order that section 1(a) of Executive Order 13694 is further amended to read as follows:

“Section 1.  (a)  All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:

(i)    the persons listed in the Annex to this order;

(ii)   any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States that are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States, and that have the purpose of or involve:

(A)  harming, or otherwise compromising the provision of services by, a computer or network of computers that support one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;

(B)  compromising the provision of services by one or more entities in a critical infrastructure sector;

(C)  causing a disruption to the availability of a computer or network of computers or compromising the integrity of the information stored on a computer or network of computers;

(D)  causing a misappropriation of funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain;

(E)  tampering with, altering, or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose of or that involves interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions; or

(F)  engaging in a ransomware attack, such as extortion through malicious use of code, encryption, or other activity to affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data or a computer or network of computers, against a United States person, the United States, a United States ally or partner or a citizen, national, or entity organized under the laws thereof; or

(iii)  any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State:

(A)  to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, the receipt or use for commercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain, or by a commercial entity, outside the United States of funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information misappropriated through cyber-enabled means, knowing they have been misappropriated, where the misappropriation of such funds or economic resources, intellectual property, proprietary or business confidential information, personal identifiers, or financial information is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States;

(B)  to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, activities related to gaining or attempting to gain unauthorized access to a computer or network of computers of a United States person, the United States, a United States ally or partner or a citizen, national, or entity organized under the laws thereof, where such efforts originate from or are directed by persons located, in whole or substantial part, outside the United States and are reasonably likely to result in, or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial stability of the United States;

(C)  to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any activity described in subsections (a)(ii) or (a)(iii)(A) or (B) of this section or any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order;

(D)  to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order or that has engaged in any activity described in subsections (a)(ii) or (a)(iii)(A) – (C) of this section;

(E)  to have attempted to engage in any of the activities described in subsections (a)(ii) and (a)(iii)(A)-(D) of this section; or

(F)  to be or have been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order or that has engaged in any activity described in subsections (a)(ii) or (a)(iii)(A) – (E) of this section.”

Sec. 10.  Definitions.  For purposes of this order:

(a)  The term “agency” has the meaning ascribed to it under 44 U.S.C. 3502(1), except for the independent regulatory agencies described in 44 U.S.C. 3502(5).

(b)  The term “artifact” means a record or data that is generated manually or by automated means and may be used to demonstrate compliance with defined practices, including for secure software development.

(c)  The term “artificial intelligence” or “AI” has the meaning set forth in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3).

(d)  The term “AI system” means any data system, software, hardware, application, tool, or utility that operates in whole or in part using AI.

     (e)  The term “authentication” means the process of determining the validity of one or more authenticators, such as a password, used to claim a digital identity.

(f)  The term “Border Gateway Protocol” or “BGP” means the control protocol used to distribute and compute paths between the tens of thousands of autonomous networks that constitute the Internet.

(g)  The term “consumer Internet-of-Things products” means Internet-of-Things products intended primarily for consumer use, rather than enterprise or industrial use.  Consumer Internet-of-Things products do not include medical devices regulated by the United States Food and Drug Administration or motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment regulated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.

(h)  The term “cyber incident” has the meaning given to the term “incident” under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(2).

(i)  The term “debilitating impact systems” means systems as described by 44 U.S.C. 3553(e)(2) and 3553(e)(3) for Department of Defense and Intelligence Community purposes, respectively.

(j)  The term “digital identity document” means an electronic, reusable, cryptographically verifiable identity credential issued by a Government source, such as a State-issued mobile driver’s license or an electronic passport.

(k)  The term “digital identity verification” means identity verification that a user performs online.

(l)  The term “endpoint” means any device that can be connected to a computer network creating an entry or exit point for data communications.  Examples of endpoints include desktop and laptop computers, smartphones, tablets, servers, workstations, virtual machines, and consumer Internet-of-Things products.

(m)  The term “endpoint detection and response” means cybersecurity tools and capabilities that combine real-time continuous monitoring and collection of endpoint data (for example, networked computing device such as workstations, mobile phones, servers) with rules-based automated response and analysis capabilities.

(n)  The term “Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies” or “FCEB agencies” includes all agencies except for the agencies and other components in the Department of Defense and agencies in the Intelligence Community.

(o)  The term “Federal information system” means an information system used or operated by an agency, a contractor of an agency, or another organization on behalf of an agency.

(p)  The term “Government-operated identity verification system” means a system owned and operated by a Federal, State, local, Tribal, or territorial Government entity that performs identity verification, including single-agency systems and shared services that provide service to multiple agencies.

(q)  The term “hardware root of trust” means an inherently trusted combination of hardware and firmware that helps to maintain the integrity of information.

(r)  The term “hybrid key establishment” means a key establishment scheme that is a combination of two or more components that are themselves cryptographic key-establishment schemes.

(s)  The term “identity verification” means the process of collecting identity information or evidence, validating its legitimacy, and confirming that it is associated with the real person providing it.

(t)  The term “Intelligence Community” has the meaning given to it under 50 U.S.C. 3003(4).

(u)  The term “key establishment” means the process by which a cryptographic key is securely shared between two or more entities.

(v)  The term “least privilege” means the principle that a security architecture is designed so that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function.

(w)  The term “machine-readable” means that the product output is in a structured format that can be consumed by another program using consistent processing logic.

(x)  The term “national security systems” or “NSS” has the meaning given to it under 44 U.S.C. 3552(b)(6).

(y)  The term “patch” means a software component that, when installed, directly modifies files or device settings related to a different software component without changing the version number or release details for the related software component.

(z)  The term “rules-as-code approach” means a coded version of rules (for example, those contained in legislation, regulation, or policy) that can be understood and used by a computer.

(aa)  The term “secure booting” means a security feature that prevents malicious software from running when a computer system starts up.  The security feature performs a series of checks during the boot sequence that helps ensure only trusted software is loaded.

(bb)  The term “security control outcome” means the results of the performance or non-performance of safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.

(cc)  The term “zero trust architecture” has the meaning given to it in Executive Order 14028.

Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented in a manner consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 16, 2025.

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SUBJECT:       Orderly Implementation of the Air Toxics Standards for Ethylene Oxide Commercial Sterilizers

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1.  Policy.  The strengthened and updated Clean Air Act standards for ethylene oxide (EtO) emitted into the air from commercial sterilizing facilities issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on April 5, 2024, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Ethylene Oxide Emissions Standards for Sterilization Facilities Residual Risk and Technology Review, Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (Apr. 5, 2024) (“EtO Rule”), achieved a new milestone in my Administration’s efforts to protect public health for all Americans and to advance the objective of my Administration’s Cancer Moonshot initiative to prevent cancer before it starts.  EtO has been associated with elevated cancer risks in communities around the United States and can be particularly harmful to children.  The loss of loved ones from environmentally related cancer is a tragedy that the Nation can and must work together to end, once and for all.  

The EtO Rule was issued after careful consideration of public comments and public hearings.  In this rule, EPA set standards under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, as amended (the “Act”) (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.), to control emissions from commercial sterilizers through the use of demonstrated and achievable pollution control technologies and practices.  These standards will significantly reduce emissions of the toxic air pollutant EtO.  

     The EtO Rule applies to facilities that sterilize medical products, including medical devices and pharmaceuticals.  Sterilization is critical to maintaining a safe supply of medical devices for patients and hospitals and providing health care to millions of Americans to help them stay healthy and fight diseases, including cancer.  Consequently, EPA worked closely with the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Food and Drug Administration, to develop a final rule that protects communities exposed to pollution from sterilization facilities while also mitigating and managing the potential risk of any medical device supply disruptions.

EPA concluded that sterilization facilities will be able to install the appropriate technology to meet the standards of the EtO Rule before the compliance deadlines mandated by the Act.  The EtO Rule also recognized that the President’s authority under section 112(i)(4) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(i)(4), to exempt individual facilities from compliance for a set period of time may provide an important mechanism to address the possibility that a facility may be unable to install all appropriate technology before the compliance deadline.  89 Fed. Reg. at 24,103. It is of vital national importance to ensure the reduction of EtO emissions to the level that EPA determined is required to protect public health pursuant to the Clean Air Act, while also avoiding the national security and public health effects that could result from a significant disruption to the medical device supply chain.

It is the policy of my Administration to safeguard the reliability of our Nation’s supply of safe medical products.  To advance orderly implementation of the EtO Rule, I am therefore establishing a process, provided below, for considering requests for Presidential exemptions, the duration of which shall be as short as possible and no longer than two years.  This process will ensure consideration of such requests in the exceptional circumstances in which a commercial sterilizer can demonstrate that, notwithstanding due diligence and best efforts, it will be unable to meet a covered standard or limitation required by the EtO Rule before the compliance deadline due to the unavailability of control technology for the facility, leading to likely shutdown of the facility, and the best available information demonstrates that the shutdown of the facility will likely lead to a serious disruption to the supply of medical products, such as medical devices and pharmaceuticals, necessary for America’s national security and public health.

To achieve the EtO Rule’s critical health protections as soon as practicable, while safeguarding the supply of safe medical products from disruption that would compromise the health and welfare of the American people, I direct you to take the following actions:

Sec. 2.  Implementation of a Process for Considering Presidential Exemptions.  The Administrator of the EPA (Administrator) shall receive requests for a Presidential exemption from a standard or limitation in the EtO Rule under section 112(i)(4) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(i)(4)), review them, and advise the President regarding whether to grant them through the following process:

(a)  Any commercial sterilizer seeking such an exemption shall submit a request to the Administrator no earlier than 12 months and no later than 4 months before the compliance deadline for which an exemption is sought.  The request shall include:

(i)  specific information of sufficient detail to enable verification of the reason or reasons that the technology to implement the applicable standard or limitation is unavailable for installation and that, notwithstanding its due diligence and best efforts, the facility cannot be brought into compliance before the compliance deadline for the covered standard or limitation (e.g., contracts, documentation of communication with vendors or suppliers);

(ii)  a plan for procuring, installing, and operating the technology as soon as feasible in order to achieve compliance with the EtO Rule, and an assurance as described in subsection (h)(ii) of this section;

(iii)  a list of all available practicable measures (i.e., technological and operational) that have already been taken or that are planned to advance compliance and additional measures, if any, that will be implemented to reduce the emissions of EtO and resulting risks during the exemption period;

(iv) a list of any alternative steps available, in progress, or already taken to try to avoid the need for additional time for compliance;

(v)  the type or types of products sterilized at the facility, the volume of products sterilized at the facility, and the facility’s annual sterilization capacity; and

(vi)  the name, title, and signature of the responsible official who is certifying the accuracy of the request.

(b)  In reviewing an exemption request, and the information provided pursuant to this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary), shall consider:

(i)  whether the technology to implement a covered standard or limitation will be unavailable in time for installation and operation of the technology at a specific facility before the compliance deadline for such standard or limitation, due, for example, to shortages of labor, parts, control technology supply, supply-chain disruption, or other factors out of the facility’s control;

(ii)  the amount of time needed for installation and operation to occur in order to achieve compliance with the EtO Rule;

(iii)  the risk of a serious disruption to the supply of medical products (including pharmaceuticals and medical devices) should the facility be required to temporarily pause sterilization activities or reduce capacity until installation and operation can occur (including any potential alternatives to assure a sufficient supply of sterilization and sterilized medical products);

(iv)  the potential effect of any such disruption on public health and welfare, and any other information that may be relevant to an evaluation of whether granting an exemption is in the national security interests of the United States; and

(vi) any other information that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, deems relevant.

(c)  No later than 30 days after receiving a request pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, the Administrator shall confirm receipt of the request, notify the requester of any additional information needed to evaluate the request, set a deadline of no later than 15 days for the requester to provide the requested information, and provide public notification that the request was submitted (including the name of, the location of, and any other information regarding the facility requesting the exemption that the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, deems relevant and appropriate to publish).

(d)  As soon as practicable and no later than 30 days after receiving all necessary information to evaluate a request pursuant to this section, the Administrator, in consultation with the Secretary, shall provide the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) with the request and accompanying information from the requester, any additional information that the Administrator deems relevant, and a recommendation regarding whether an exemption is warranted, including the basis for the recommendation, and if recommending that the President grant an exemption: the recommended duration, and any other accompanying terms or conditions (such as a schedule for status reports regarding planned steps and progress to achieve compliance with the EtO Rule).

(e)  As soon as practicable and generally within 45 days after receiving a recommendation from the Administrator pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, the Chairman of CEQ, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, the Director of the Office of Pandemic Preparedness and Response Policy, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall advise the President concerning the request for an exemption.

(f)  As expeditiously as practicable after the grant or denial of any exemption by the President under this process, and no later than 10 days after such a grant or denial, the Administrator shall notify the applicant.

(g)  Within 60 days of the grant of any exemption by the President under this process, the Administrator shall make publicly available online the name of, location of, and any other appropriate and relevant information regarding the facility receiving the exemption and the duration of any exemption, and shall submit to Congress the report required by section 112(i)(4) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 7412(i)(4)) on behalf of the President.

(h)  The Administrator shall, as appropriate:

(i)  provide technical assistance to any facility that receives an exemption to promote compliance with the EtO Rule;

(ii)  seek information and assurance from any facility that requests an exemption that the facility will use its best efforts and will take reasonable and appropriate steps to demonstrate diligent action to install and operate necessary technology as expeditiously as practicable (including to fulfill any accompanying terms or conditions) to achieve compliance with the EtO Rule; and

(iii)  inform the Chairman of CEQ when installation of such technology is complete.

Sec. 3.  Federal Coordination.  The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator, shall consider taking additional steps, as appropriate, to further advance the goal of protecting the public from cancer and other harms from EtO exposure, including spurring innovation to reduce exposure to EtO and other carcinogenic air pollutants and to expand access to safe, effective, and reliable alternative methods for sterilization of medical equipment and pharmaceuticals that do not depend on EtO, and continuing to strengthen the resilience of our Nation’s medical supply chain.  Within 2 years of the date of this memorandum, the Secretary shall provide a report to the Chairman of CEQ regarding progress toward this directive and any steps taken or planned.

Sec. 4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

     (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

     (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

(d)  The Administrator is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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     By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

     I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, in view of changing circumstances on the ground in Syria and in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria), hereby order:

Section 1.  Amendments to Executive Order 13894.  Executive Order 13894 is hereby amended by:

(a)  striking from the second paragraph the phrase “, and in particular the recent actions by the Government of Turkey to conduct a military offensive into northeast Syria,”;

(b)  striking subsections (1)(a)(i)(B)-(F) and inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:

“(B)  to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order; or

(C)  to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.”; and

     (c)  striking subsection 8(f).

Sec. 2.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

1. the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other persons.



                                            JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 15, 2025.

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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:


     Pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby report that I have issued an Executive Order in order to take additional steps with respect to the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13894 of October 14, 2019 (Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria).   

     The order makes minimal edits to Executive Order 13894 in light of the fact that certain operations referenced in that order ceased 5 years ago.  In particular, under the amended order, the United States may still sanction any person determined to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have directly or indirectly engaged in, or attempted to engage in actions or policies that further threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of Syria or the commission of serious human rights abuse.

I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued. 



                                                                                                 JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 15, 2025.

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   On February 11, 2022, by Executive Order 14064, I declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan.

     The widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan — including the urgent needs of the people of Afghanistan for food security, livelihoods support, water, sanitation, health, hygiene, and shelter and settlement assistance, among other basic human needs — and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  In addition, the preservation of certain property of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) held in the United States by United States financial institutions is of the utmost importance to addressing this national emergency and the welfare of the people of Afghanistan.  Various parties, including representatives of victims of terrorism, have asserted legal claims against certain property of DAB or indicated in public court filings an intent to make such claims.  This property is blocked under Executive Order 14064.

     For these reasons, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14064 of February 11, 2022, must continue in effect beyond February 11, 2024.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14064 with respect to the widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan.

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 15, 2025.

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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:


     Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.  In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan declared in Executive Order 14064 of February 11, 2022, is to continue in effect beyond February 11, 2025.

     The widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan — including the urgent needs of the people of Afghanistan for food security, livelihoods support, water, sanitation, health, hygiene, and shelter and settlement assistance, among other basic human needs — and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  In addition, the preservation of certain property of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB) held in the United States by United States financial institutions is of the utmost importance to addressing this national emergency and the welfare of the people of Afghanistan.  Various parties, including representatives of victims of terrorism, have asserted legal claims against certain property of DAB or indicated in public court filings an intent to make such claims.  This property is blocked under Executive Order 14064.

     Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14064 with respect to the widespread humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and the potential for a deepening economic collapse in Afghanistan.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.




THE WHITE HOUSE,
    January 15, 2025.

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Presidential Determination

No.        2025-03        

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Subject:       Eligibility of the Republic of Cyprus to Receive

Defense Articles and Defense Services Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act

Pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, including section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and section 3(a)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to the Republic of Cyprus will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.

You are authorized and directed to transmit this determination and the accompanying memorandum of justification to the Congress and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY

SUBJECT:       Extending and Expanding Eligibility for Deferred Enforced Departure for Certain Hong Kong Residents

The United States supports the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the residents of Hong Kong.  The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has continued to significantly erode those rights and freedoms.  I am therefore directing an extension and expansion of the deferral of removal of certain Hong Kong residents, regardless of country of birth, who are present in the United States.

By unilaterally imposing on Hong Kong the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (NSL) in June 2020, the PRC has undermined the enjoyment of rights and freedoms in Hong Kong, including those protected under the Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration.  Following the NSL’s enactment, the PRC has continued its assault on Hong Kong’s autonomy, undermining its remaining democratic processes and institutions, imposing limits on academic freedom, and cracking down on freedom of the press.  Since June 2020, at least 200 opposition politicians, activists, and protesters have been taken into custody on politically motivated NSL-related charges including secession, subversion, terrorist activities, and collusion with a foreign country or external elements.  On November 19, 2024, Hong Kong authorities also sentenced 45 pro-democracy advocates to prison for their peaceful participation in political activities protected under the Basic Law of Hong Kong.

There are compelling foreign policy reasons to extend Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) for an additional period for those residents of Hong Kong presently residing in the United States who were under a grant of DED until February 5, 2025, as well as to defer enforced departure for other Hong Kong residents who arrived in the United States subsequent to the initial grant of DED.  The United States is committed to a foreign policy that unites our democratic values with our foreign policy goals, which is centered on the defense of democracy and the promotion of human rights around the world.  Offering safe haven for Hong Kong residents who have been deprived of their guaranteed freedoms in Hong Kong furthers United States interests in the region.  The United States will continue to stand firm in our support of the people in Hong Kong.

Pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, I have determined that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to defer for 24 months the removal of any Hong Kong resident, regardless of country of birth, who is present in the United States on the date of this memorandum, except for those:

(1)  who have voluntarily returned to Hong Kong or the PRC after the date of this memorandum;

(2)  who have not continuously resided in the United States since the date of this memorandum;

(3)  who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)) or deportable under section 237(a)(4) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(4));

(4)  who have been convicted of any felony or two or more misdemeanors committed in the United States, or who meet any of the criteria set forth in section 208(b)(2)(A) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A));

(5)  who are subject to extradition;

(6)  whose presence in the United States the Secretary of Homeland Security has determined is not in the interest of the United States or presents a danger to public safety; or

(7)  whose presence in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.

I further direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to take appropriate measures to authorize employment for noncitizens whose removal has been deferred, as provided by this memorandum, for the duration of such deferral, including by extending through February 5, 2027, employment authorization for individuals with current employment authorization under prior grants of DED for certain Hong Kong residents, and to consider suspending regulatory requirements with respect to F-1 nonimmigrant students who are Hong Kong residents as the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be appropriate.  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall also provide for the prompt issuance of new or replacement documents in appropriate cases.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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In southeastern California, where the Mojave and Colorado Deserts intersect, ancient trails weave through a land of canyon-carved mountain ranges bound together by radiating alluvial bajadas and dark tendrils of dry wash woodlands.  Sharing a name with the wide-bodied lizard that is commonly found here and derived from the Cahuilla word “čáxwal,” the Chuckwalla region is a place of wonder that lies within the traditional homelands of the Iviatim (Cahuilla), Nüwü (Chemehuevi), Pipa Aha Macav (Mojave), Kwatsáan (Quechan), Maara’yam and Marringayam (Serrano), and other Indigenous peoples.  It is imbued with religious, spiritual, historic, and cultural significance for Tribal Nations that trace their origins to these lands.  The area contains an abundance of artifacts attesting to its connection to diverse human communities over thousands of years.  The region’s mosaic of habitats is also home to a remarkable array of plant and animal species.  The dramatic contortions of its mountain ranges embody a fundamental story about the shaping of our world that scientists are still learning to decipher.  The cultural, geologic, and ecological resources on Federal lands in the Chuckwalla region will continue to inspire and fascinate people and provide a scientific research trove for generations to come.

The Chuckwalla region comprises five geographically discrete areas located between Joshua Tree National Park and the Palen/McCoy Wilderness to the north, California State Route 78 to the east, the Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range to the south, and the western boundary of the Mecca Hills Wilderness to the west.  Woven together by the physical threads of Indigenous trails that radiate outward connecting peoples and places throughout the Southwest, the region carries significant cultural and sacred meaning for many Tribal Nations.  The southern area is a vast and intact expanse of austere, beautiful mountain ranges and desert valleys stretching from the Mecca Hills and Orocopia Mountains in the northwest, to the Mule and Palo Verde Mountains in the northeast, and to the mesquite-studded draws of the Milpitas Wash in the southeast.  The other four areas, which lie in the transition zone between the Mojave and Colorado deserts, are located at the base of the Cottonwood, Eagle, Coxcomb, and Palen Mountains.

The imprints of generations of Indigenous peoples are found throughout the region in the trails, tools, habitation sites, and spectacular petroglyphs and pictographs they left behind.  The Chuckwalla region has also been marked by the passage of people on the major prehistoric and historic travel corridors that connected the region to the Pacific coast and the interior southwest.  While only a small fraction of the region has been formally inventoried, myriad cultural resources have been documented, and there are likely similar historic sites and objects yet to be discovered.  A few sites are well-known and easily accessible to the public; many others are concealed in labyrinths of rugged canyons and have not yet been formally studied.

Trails within the area helped to link important resources and people across the Indigenous homelands of the Chuckwalla region.  For centuries, they facilitated trade and cultural exchange between peoples throughout the Southwest.  Weaving through canyons, the trails connected indispensable water and other resources throughout the area.  They were, and are, essential to the people who trace their origins to these lands, and provide a sense of connection between generations and between the physical and spiritual worlds.

In some places, the footfalls of past generations have etched these trails into the region’s surface, wearing a clear path into desert pavement.  Ceramics and lithic scatter are also commonly found along trail routes within the Chuckwalla region.  The endless shifting of sand and alluvium have likely obscured artifacts in some locations.  A prehistoric travel route ran through the core of the northern area between the Eagle and Coxcomb Mountains, connecting the Pinto Basin, where some of California’s oldest artifacts have been found, and the Chuckwalla Valley.  The relatively narrow gap between the Eagle and Coxcomb Mountains traversed by the corridor also creates the conditions for flash floods; as a result, artifacts are likely to be found below the surface of the wash rather than on its surface.

At least two trails that traverse the Chuckwalla region are sacred to Tribal Nations and bind their members to the land and to generations past.  These trails, of which physical traces remain, are both ancient and modern, tangible places and passages that Tribes and Indigenous peoples evoke and visit through songs and dreams.  Two versions of the Salt Song Trail pass through the region, connecting it to Tribal communities and sacred sites throughout the Southwest physically and through songs describing corridors, viewsheds, and the related geography and resources.  While the Salt Song Trail can be traveled by foot, traditional singers also travel this trail by voice through songs passed down across generations and that Tribes and Indigenous peoples believe assist the transport of the spirits of the recently deceased.  

The Xam Kwatchan Trail, which parallels the Colorado River in the vicinity of the Mule and Palo Verde Mountains along the eastern edge of the southern area, is maintained by the Quechan people and recognized by many other Tribes of the Lower Colorado River.  Portions of the Xam Kwatchan Trail are still visible and may be traveled physically as the trail weaves through the area and links together three sacred peaks of the Southwest:  Avi Kwa Ame to the north of the Chuckwalla region near Lake Mead, Palo Verde Peak within the southern Chuckwalla region and overlooking the Colorado River, and Pilot Knob to the south of the Chuckwalla region near Yuma, Arizona.  It is a belief of the Quechan people that they also travel this trail through dreams to transport the living and deceased, and to tie them to these lands and to their origin at Avi Kwa Ame.  The Palo Verde and Mule Mountains encompass sites of particular significance along this trail.  The eastern side of the Palo Verde Mountains is particularly dense with evidence of human habitation, including trails, camp spots, and ceremonial fire hearths. 

The Chuckwalla region has no perennial streams or lakes, but hidden within the southern area’s mountain ranges are springs and natural seasonal water catchments (often referred to as tanks).  Knowledge of these water sources has allowed Indigenous people to survive within this arid environment for thousands of years.  The locations surrounding these springs and tanks are replete with artifacts, including stone tools, ceramics, remnants of habitations, and a dazzling array of petroglyphs and pictographs.  In some places, the patina of naturally created desert pavement has been scraped away to form circles and images known as geoglyphs.

In a wide canyon at the heart of the Chuckwalla Mountains lies Corn Springs, a well-known cultural site.  Amid the mountain range’s rugged peaks and dry washes, the oasis at Corn Springs, which supports a stand of more than 60 California fan palms, has long been a beacon to the area’s human occupants. Corn Springs contains extensive petroglyphs encompassing a diverse array of elements and representing contributions by many people over thousands of years.  These petroglyphs, which are listed on the National Register of Historic Places, are carved into flat planes on the golden rocks found near Corn Springs.  

Jutting from the desert floor north of Corn Springs, in an area just south of the community of Desert Center, sits Alligator Rock.  A salient ridge containing dikes of aplite, Alligator Rock was both a milestone on the major Indigenous travel and trade route that passed through Chuckwalla Valley and an important prehistoric source of lithic materials.  Flakes and tools crafted from the area’s distinctive speckled stone have been documented in sites throughout Chuckwalla Valley. 

In the eastern area, northeast of Alligator Rock and Corn Springs and north of the Little Chuckwalla Mountain Wilderness, Ford Dry Lake is now a sparsely vegetated playa in the Chuckwalla Valley at the base of the Palen and McCoy Mountains.  Dense cultural sites have been documented along the lake’s ancient shorelines, attesting to its use by generations of Indigenous peoples.  Artifacts uncovered here include a variety of stone tools, ceramics, and other evidence of Indigenous habitation sites. 

While seemingly inhospitable to humans, the Chuckwalla region has provided sustenance and material resources to the Indigenous peoples who have inhabited and traversed it for generations.  Many of the region’s native plants were gathered for food, including mesquite and ironwood seeds, wild grasses, and cacti.  Mesquite, which thrives in the dry washes of the southern area between the Chocolate and Palo Verde Mountains, was a particularly important source of sustenance.  Large quantities of the beans were collected in the summer and stored for use throughout the year.  In 1972, a large ceramic olla (an earthenware vessel) containing mesquite beans was discovered in a rock shelter in the canyon-striated Mecca Hills of the far western corner of the southern area.

By the mid-1800s, the Chuckwalla region had caught the attention of non-Indigenous Americans seeking wealth in the underbelly of its mountains.  In the 1860s, the Mule Mountains — near the California-Arizona border — were the site of one of the first discoveries of gold in Riverside County.  Two decades later, the largest gold rush in Riverside County’s history occurred when gold and silver were discovered in the Chuckwalla Mountains.  Relics of historic mines, including shafts, trenches, equipment, and remnants of buildings, are present throughout the region’s mountain ranges.  A mining shaft, conveyor, and loading dock associated with the Model Mine, which operated around the turn of the last century, are located in the western foothills of the Chuckwalla Mountains.  

In 1862, as gold seekers spread throughout the region, a miner named William Bradshaw sought to develop a route to connect the Coachella Valley with expanding mines on the east side of the Colorado River.  A Cahuilla leader and another Indigenous trail runner provided Bradshaw with a map of existing Indigenous routes linking springs and tanks along the southern edge of the Orocopia, Chuckwalla, and Little Chuckwalla Mountains.  He used the knowledge shared with him of these existing Indigenous trails to identify what became known as the “Bradshaw Trail,” an overland route that traverses the Chuckwalla Bench through the heart of the southern area.  Some of the springs and tanks, which had long been used by Indigenous peoples, became stagecoach stations associated with the Bradshaw Trail.  Intrepid visitors can still drive the unpaved Bradshaw Trail, which the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) designated as a National Backcountry Byway in 1992.

In 1942, shortly after the United States entered World War II, the Department of the Army established a presence in the Chuckwalla region, reminders of which can still be seen across the terrain.  In March of 1942, Major General George Patton selected a large swath of desert in California and Nevada, including a substantial amount of land in the Chuckwalla Valley, for a Desert Training Center to prepare United States Army units for desert combat.  By the end of World War II, over a million soldiers had been trained at the facility.  Small unit training exercises were held in Chuckwalla Valley, which the Army believed provided the best approximation of terrain they might face in parts of North Africa.  The scars of tank tracks across the southern area’s desert pavement can still be seen today, along with berms, trenches, and foxholes.

The Chuckwalla region includes the footprint of Camp Young, the Desert Training Center’s first camp and its administrative core.  Camp Young was primarily located south of present-day Joshua Tree National Park and north of Interstate 10 in the western area.  While none remain standing, Camp Young boasted almost 100 administrative buildings, two hospitals, 50 warehouses, a theater, an officers’ club, and a post office.  Traces of the soldiers’ lives at Camp Young can still be seen here, including rock-lined walkways and remnants of concrete foundations.

During his tenure at the Desert Training Center, General Patton lived at Camp Young but was in the field on a daily basis, including to review small unit training exercises in the Chuckwalla Valley.  He would often shout orders into a radio while observing tank maneuvers from a hill overlooking the valley between the Orocopia and Chuckwalla Mountains, in the center of the Chuckwalla region’s southern area.  The road bulldozed for Patton’s use to the top of this hill, known as “The King’s Throne,” remains clearly visible.

Against this backdrop of human history, the Chuckwalla region’s many and varied plant and animal inhabitants have continued to persevere in the harsh desert environment.  The region provides a refuge for more than 50 rare plants and animals, as well as 21 vulnerable vegetation communities.  The diversity of biota has attracted numerous scientists over many decades who have conducted research into topics as varied as testing translocation methods for bighorn sheep, studying ant colony forming behavior, and documenting the demographic patterns of the Orocopia sage, a shrub with delicate lavender flowers that is only known to grow in the Mecca Hills and Orocopia and Chocolate Mountains. 

The broad bajadas of the southern area radiate out from a series of small mountain ranges, whose sinuous canyons and ragged peaks provide habitat to a variety of species.  The washes and sandy slopes of the Orocopia Mountains are home to Orocopia sage.  The Mecca aster is endemic to only a small area, with more than half of its known occurrences located in the Mecca Hills.  Mountain areas in the Chuckwalla region are also the only known locations of the recently described Chuckwalla cholla, a relatively low-lying cactus with reddish flowers.

Desert bighorn sheep, a sensitive species with declining numbers, live year-round on the craggy slopes of the Orocopia and Chuckwalla Mountains and are occasionally glimpsed in the Palo Verde and Little Chuckwalla Mountains.  The broad, sandy washes that connect the mountains — unbroken by paved roads or large developments — provide the habitat connectivity necessary to preserve genetic diversity among bighorn sheep populations.

The region’s expanse of gently sloping shrubby terrain is also vital to the survival of the threatened Agassiz’s desert tortoise, encompassing key components of an essential corridor connecting the tortoise’s Chuckwalla and Chemehuevi populations.  Much of the region is critical habitat for this charismatic desert dweller.

Located in the southern area of the Chuckwalla region, the Chuckwalla Bench is an elevated area of alluvial fans that provided a setting for extensive study and monitoring of desert tortoises for decades.  It is also home to over 150 native plant species.  The specific species present change with elevation as the bench’s slopes climb to an 80,000-acre expanse that rises to approximately 2,000 feet in elevation, resulting in an environment that is notably cooler and wetter than is typical for the Sonoran Desert.  At the higher elevations, Mojave yucca and cholla become increasingly common.  The Munz’s cholla, a species endemic to the Chuckwalla Bench whose spiny, branching arms often reach a height of six feet, grows here.

In part because of the relative availability of forage and water, the Chuckwalla Bench is included in the United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s primary area of interest for Sonoran Desert pronghorn reintroduction in California.  In 1941, around the time that the United States Army began desert training in the area, the endangered Sonoran Desert pronghorn was last observed in the Colorado Desert in the vicinity of Salt Creek Wash, which runs between the Orocopia and Chocolate Mountains.

Dry washes in the Chuckwalla region are threaded with populations of desert trees including ironwood, blue palo verde, smoketree, and mesquite.  These are known as microphyll woodlands, and they provide migration corridors for desert wildlife, as well as crucial habitat for migratory birds.  Milpitas Wash, located south of the Palo Verde Mountains in the southern area near the Arizona border, is one of the largest remaining microphyll woodlands in the Colorado Desert.  It is identified as a component of the National Audubon Society’s Colorado Desert Microphyll Woodlands Important Bird Area.  Old-growth blue palo verde trees in Milpitas Wash provide nesting cavities for an important population of Gila woodpeckers, which are listed as endangered under the California Endangered Species Act.  Rare long-eared owls, Crissal thrashers, and black-tailed gnatcatchers also nest in Milpitas Wash.

Dense pockets of palo verde microphyll woodland occur in the northeast portion of the southern Chuckwalla region and are reported to have the highest winter bird densities in the California Desert.  Sand dunes have dammed several small washes in the area, creating relatively wet conditions that are conducive to dense vegetative growth.  These sand dunes in Chuckwalla Valley are fed by aeolian (windblown) sand transport corridors.  In addition to the rich cultural sites associated with Ford Dry Lake, the portion of the Chuckwalla Valley in the eastern Chuckwalla region protects part of these sand transport corridors.  The dunes in this area also provide habitat for the rare Mojave fringe-toed lizard.

Nightfall reveals another dimension of the Chuckwalla region.  Kit foxes and sensitive species such as burrowing owls and elf owls emerge from dens, while a variety of rare bats including the California leaf-nosed bat, the western mastiff bat, and the western yellow bat dart through the desert sky.  Mountain lions are also known to prowl the Chuckwalla region at night.  A population of mountain lions in southern California and the central coast of California, which includes those in the Chuckwalla region, is currently a candidate species under consideration for listing under the California Endangered Species Act.  

The Chuckwalla region encompasses striking geologic diversity, which both underpins the rich ecological and cultural values and is itself the focus of extensive research.  In the far western reach of the southern area of this region, the Mecca Hills, shaped by the unquiet presence of the San Andreas Fault, attract not only hikers eager to explore their intricate canyons but a long line of geologists seeking to better understand fault dynamics.  There is an exposure of Pliocene-Pleistocene terrestrial sedimentary rocks along the fault, and recent uplift and erosion have allowed the opportunity for its detailed analysis.  Researchers have analyzed the Painted Canyon Fault, which lies within the San Andreas strike-slip fault zone in the Mecca Hills, to better understand tectonic processes along faults as far away as Denmark.  

Just to the east of the Mecca Hills, the Orocopia Mountains have been the site of extensive study of the geologic mechanisms that shape the earth, including deposition, metamorphism, uplift, and exposure.  In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Orocopia Mountains were the site of field training for the Apollo 13 and 15 crews, preparing them to observe and document lunar geology.

In 1986, scientists documented five new species of mollusks from the Eocene epoch that were found in samples taken from the Orocopia Mountains, which helped clarify scientists’ understanding of the timing of the westward migration of Eurasian mollusk species during the early Eocene and late Paleocene epochs.  In the Palo Verde Mountains, at the southeastern edge of the Chuckwalla region, outcroppings of the Bouse Formation are helping scientists unlock mysteries around the formation of the Colorado River. 

Protecting the Chuckwalla region will preserve an important spiritual, cultural, prehistoric, and historic legacy and protect places inscribed with history for future generations; maintain a diverse array of natural and scientific resources; and help ensure that the prehistoric, historic, and scientific resources and values of the region endure for the benefit of all Americans.  As described above, the region contains numerous objects of historic and scientific interest, and it provides exceptional outdoor recreational opportunities, including hiking, camping, backpacking, rockhounding, sightseeing, nature study, birding, horseback riding, hunting, climbing, mountain biking, and motorized recreation, all of which are important to the travel- and tourism-based economy of the region.

WHEREAS, section 320301 of title 54, United States Code (the “Antiquities Act”), authorizes the President, in the President’s discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be national monuments, and to reserve as a part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which shall be confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected; and

     WHEREAS, the Chuckwalla region has been profoundly sacred to Tribal Nations and Indigenous peoples with ties to the Colorado and Mojave Deserts since time immemorial; and

WHEREAS, it is in the public interest both to ensure the preservation, restoration, and protection of the objects of scientific and historic interest identified above and to advance renewable energy in Development Focus Areas (DFAs) that were identified by the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan (DRECP) as of the date of this proclamation; and

     Whereas, I find that all the objects identified above, and objects of the type identified above within the area described herein, are objects of historic or scientific interest in need of protection under section 320301 of title 54, United States Code, regardless of whether they are expressly identified as objects of historic or scientific interest in the text of this proclamation; and

     Whereas, I find that there are threats to the objects identified in this proclamation, and, in the absence of a reservation under the Antiquities Act, the objects identified in this proclamation are not adequately protected by applicable law or administrative designations, thus making a national monument designation and reservation necessary to protect the objects of historic and scientific interest identified above for current and future generations; and

     Whereas, I find that the boundaries of the monument reserved by this proclamation represent the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects of historic or scientific interest identified above, as required by the Antiquities Act; and

     Whereas, it is in the public interest to ensure the preservation, restoration, and protection of the objects of historic and scientific interest identified above;

     Now, Therefore, I, Joseph R. Biden JR., President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by section 320301 of title 54, United States Code, hereby proclaim the objects identified above that are situated upon lands and interests in lands owned or controlled by the Federal Government to be the Chuckwalla National Monument (monument) and, for the purpose of protecting those objects, reserve as part thereof all lands and interests in lands that are owned or controlled by the Federal Government within the boundaries described on the accompanying map, which is attached hereto and forms a part of this proclamation.  These reserved Federal lands and interests in lands encompass approximately 624,270 acres.  As a result of the distribution of the objects across the Chuckwalla region, the boundaries described on the accompanying map are confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects of historic or scientific interest identified above.

     All Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of the monument are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from all forms of entry, location, selection, sale, or other disposition under the public land laws, other than by exchange that furthers the protective purposes of the monument or that facilitates the remediation, monitoring, or reclamation of historic mining operations on public or private land within the monument boundary; from location, entry, and patent under the mining laws; and from disposition under all laws relating to mineral and geothermal leasing.

     The establishment of the monument is subject to valid existing rights.  If the Federal Government subsequently acquires any lands or interests in lands not currently owned or controlled by the Federal Government within the boundaries described on the accompanying map, such lands and interests in lands shall be reserved as a part of the monument, and objects of the type identified above that are situated upon those lands and interests in lands shall be part of the monument, upon acquisition of ownership or control by the Federal Government.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to alter the valid existing water rights of any party, including the United States, or to alter or affect agreements governing the management and administration of the Colorado River, including any existing interstate water compact.  This proclamation does not reserve water as a matter of Federal law. 

     The Secretary of the Interior (Secretary), through the BLM, shall manage the monument pursuant to applicable legal authorities, as a unit of the National Landscape Conservation System, and in accordance with the terms, conditions, and management direction provided by this proclamation.

     For purposes of protecting and restoring the objects identified above, the Secretary shall within 3 years from the date of this proclamation prepare a management plan for the monument and shall promulgate such rules and regulations for the management of the monument as deemed appropriate.  The Secretary, through the BLM, shall consult with other Federal land management agencies or agency components in the local area, including the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Defense, and National Park Service, in developing the management plan. 

The Secretary shall provide for maximum public involvement in the development of the management plan, as well as consultation with Tribal Nations affiliated culturally or historically with the Chuckwalla Region and conferral with State and local governments.  In preparing the management plan, the Secretary shall take into account, to the maximum extent practicable, maintaining the undeveloped character of the lands within the monument; minimizing impacts from surface-disturbing activities; providing appropriate and, where consistent with the proper care and management of the objects of historic or scientific interest identified above, improving access for recreation, hunting, dispersed camping, wildlife management, scientific research, and the permissible casual collection of rocks; and emphasizing the retention of natural quiet, dark night skies, and scenic attributes of the region.

The Secretary shall consider appropriate mechanisms to provide for temporary closures to the general public of specific portions of the monument to protect the privacy of cultural, religious, and gathering activities of members of Tribal Nations.

The Secretary, through the BLM, shall establish an advisory committee under chapter 10 of title 5, United States Code (commonly known as the Federal Advisory Committee Act), to provide advice or recommendations regarding the development of the management plan and, as appropriate, management of the monument.  The advisory committee shall consist of a fair and balanced representation of interested stakeholders, including State agencies and local governments; Tribal Nations; recreational users; conservation organizations; the scientific community; the renewable energy and electric utility industry; and the general public in the region.

In recognition of the value of collaboration with Tribal Nations for the proper care and management of the objects identified above and to ensure that management of the monument is informed by, integrates, and reflects Tribal expertise and Indigenous Knowledge, as appropriate, the Secretary shall meaningfully engage with Tribal Nations with cultural or historical affiliation to the Chuckwalla region, including by seeking opportunities for co-stewardship of the monument. 

If Tribal Nations with cultural or historical affiliation to the Chuckwalla region independently establish a commission or other similar entity (commission) comprised of elected officers or official designees from each participating Tribal Nation to engage in co-stewardship of the monument with the Federal Government through shared responsibilities or administration, then the Secretary shall meaningfully engage the commission in the development, revision, or amendment of the management plan and the management of the monument, including by considering and, as appropriate, integrating the Indigenous Knowledge and special expertise of the members of the commission in the planning and management of the monument.  The management plan for the monument shall also set forth parameters for continued meaningful engagement with the commission, if established, in the implementation of the management plan and, as appropriate, incorporate public education on and interpretation of traditional place names and the cultural significance of land within the monument.  The Secretary shall explore opportunities to provide support to the commission, if established, to enable participation in the planning and management of the monument.

The Secretary shall also explore entering into cooperative agreements or contracts, pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 5301 et seq. or other applicable authorities, with Tribes or Tribal organizations to perform administrative or management functions within the monument and providing technical and financial assistance to improve the capacity of Tribal Nations to develop, enter into, and carry out activities under such cooperative agreements or contracts.  The Secretary also shall explore opportunities for funding agreements with Tribal Nations relating to the management and protection of traditional cultural properties and other culturally significant programming associated with the monument.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to alter, modify, abrogate, enlarge, or diminish the rights or jurisdiction of any Tribal Nation, including off-reservation reserved rights.  The Secretary shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law and in consultation with Tribal Nations, ensure the protection of sacred sites and cultural properties and sites in the monument and shall provide access to Tribal members for traditional cultural, spiritual, and customary uses, consistent with the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (42 U.S.C. 1996), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), Executive Order 13007 of May 24, 1996 (Indian Sacred Sites), and the November 10, 2021, Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Interagency Coordination and Collaboration for the Protection of Indigenous Sacred Sites.  Such uses shall include, but are not limited to, the collection of medicines, berries, plants, and other vegetation for cradle boards and other purposes, and firewood for ceremonial practices and personal noncommercial use, so long as each use is carried out consistent with applicable law and in a manner consistent with the proper care and management of the objects identified above.  The Secretary shall endeavor to prepare an ethnographic study and cultural resources survey of the monument to assess the importance of the land to Tribal Nations affiliated culturally or historically with the Chuckwalla Region and the religious, spiritual, and cultural practices of culturally affiliated Tribal Nations.

The Secretary shall explore mechanisms, consistent with applicable law, to enable the protection of Indigenous Knowledge or other information relating to the nature and specific location of cultural resources within the monument and, to the extent practicable, shall explain to the holders of such knowledge or information any limitations on the ability to protect such information from disclosure before it is shared with the BLM.

     Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to preclude the renewal or assignment of, or interfere with the operation, maintenance, replacement, modification, upgrade, or access to, existing or previously approved flood control, utility, pipeline, and telecommunications sites or facilities; roads or highway corridors; seismic monitoring facilities; wildlife management structures installed by the BLM or the State of California; or water infrastructure, including wildlife water developments or water district facilities, within the boundaries of existing or previously approved authorizations within the monument.  Existing or previously approved flood control, utility (including electric transmission and distribution), pipeline, telecommunications, and seismic monitoring facilities; roads or highway corridors; wildlife management structures installed by the BLM or the State of California; and water infrastructure, including wildlife water developments or water district facilities, may be expanded, and new facilities of such kind may be constructed, to the extent consistent with the proper care and management of the objects identified above and subject to the Secretary’s authorities, other applicable law, and the provisions of this proclamation related to roads and trails.

For purposes of protecting and restoring the objects identified above, the Secretary shall prepare a transportation plan that designates the roads and trails on which motorized and non-motorized mechanized vehicle use will be allowed.  The transportation plan shall include management decisions necessary to protect the objects identified in this proclamation.  Except for emergency purposes and authorized administrative purposes, including management activities by appropriate California State agencies to maintain, enhance, or restore fish and wildlife populations and habitats, which are otherwise consistent with applicable law, motorized vehicle use in the monument may be permitted only on roads and trails documented as existing in BLM route inventories that exist as of the date of this proclamation.  Any additional roads or trails designated for motorized vehicle use by the general public must be designated only for public safety needs or if necessary for the protection of the objects identified above.

Livestock grazing has not been permitted in the monument area since 2002, and the Secretary shall not issue any new grazing permits or leases on such lands.

     Nothing in this proclamation shall affect the BLM’s ability to authorize access to and remediation or monitoring of contaminated lands within the monument, including for remediation of unexploded ordnance and mine, mill, or tailing sites or for the restoration of natural resources. 

Nothing in this proclamation shall preclude low-level overflights of military aircraft, the landing of military aircraft in accordance with aviation safety regulations in landing zones that have been or are designated in the future, military flight testing or evaluation, the designation of new units of special use airspace, the use of existing or the establishment of new military flight training routes, or low-level overflights and landings of aircraft by the BLM or its contractors for scientific or resource management purposes.  Nothing in this proclamation shall preclude the use of land within the monument for military training, or preclude air or ground access to existing or new electronic tracking or communications sites associated with special use airspace and military flight training routes, after appropriate coordination between the Department of Defense and the Department of the Interior.

As this monument is located near DFAs identified by the DRECP and is consistent with the goals of that plan, nothing in this proclamation shall be interpreted to require denial of proposals for renewable energy projects that are in DFAs identified by the DRECP and that comply with all applicable legal requirements.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction or authority of the State of California with respect to fish and wildlife management, including hunting and fishing, on the lands reserved by this proclamation.  The Secretary shall seek to develop and implement science-based habitat and ecological restoration projects within the monument and shall seek to collaborate with the State of California on wildlife management within the monument, including through the development of new, or the continuation of existing, agreements with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife.

The Secretary shall evaluate opportunities to enter into one or more agreements with governments, including State, local, and Tribal, regarding the protection of the objects identified above during wildland fire prevention and response efforts. Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to alter the authority or responsibility of any party with respect to emergency response activities within the monument, including wildland fire response.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to limit the authority of the Secretary, consistent with applicable law, to undertake or authorize activities for the purpose of ensuring safe and continued recreational access to canyons in the Mecca Hills Wilderness.

Nothing in this proclamation shall be deemed to revoke any existing withdrawal, reservation, or appropriation; however, the monument shall be the dominant reservation.

     Warning is hereby given to all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, destroy, or remove any feature of the monument and not to locate or settle upon any of the lands thereof.

     If any provision of this proclamation, including its application to a particular parcel of land, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and its application to other parcels of land shall not be affected thereby.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourteenth day of January, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

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TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

Section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)) provides for the automatic termination of a national emergency unless, within 90 days prior to the anniversary date of its declaration, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that the emergency is to continue in effect beyond the anniversary date.  In accordance with this provision, I have sent to the Federal Register for publication the enclosed notice stating that the national emergency with respect to the situation in the West Bank declared in Executive Order 14115 of February 1, 2024, is to continue in effect beyond February 1, 2025.

The situation in the West Bank — in particular high levels of extremist settler violence, forced displacement of people and villages, and property destruction — has reached intolerable levels and constitutes a serious threat to the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and the broader Middle East region.  These actions undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution and ensuring Israelis and Palestinians can attain equal measures of security, prosperity, and freedom.  They also undermine the security of Israel and have the potential to lead to broader regional destabilization across the Middle East, threatening United States personnel and interests.

The situation in the West Bank continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  Therefore, I have determined that it is necessary to continue the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14115 with respect to the situation in the West Bank.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 14, 2025.

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On February 1, 2024, by Executive Order 14115, I declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States constituted by the situation in the West Bank. 

The situation in the West Bank — in particular high levels of extremist settler violence, forced displacement of people and villages, and property destruction — has reached intolerable levels and constitutes a serious threat to the peace, security, and stability of the West Bank and Gaza, Israel, and the broader Middle East region.  These actions undermine the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the viability of a two-state solution and ensuring Israelis and Palestinians can attain equal measures of security, prosperity, and freedom.  They also undermine the security of Israel and have the potential to lead to broader regional destabilization across the Middle East, threatening United States personnel and interests.

The situation in the West Bank continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14115 of February 1, 2024, must continue in effect beyond February 1, 2025.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency declared in Executive Order 14115 with respect to the situation in the West Bank.

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 14, 2025.

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TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

     With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Arab Emirates on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (the “Treaty”), signed at Abu Dhabi on February 24, 2022.  I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

     The Treaty is one of a series of modern mutual legal assistance treaties negotiated by the United States to more effectively counter criminal activities.  The Treaty should enhance our ability to investigate and prosecute a wide variety of crimes.

     The Treaty provides for a broad range of cooperation in criminal matters.  Under the Treaty, the Parties agree to assist each other by, among other things:  taking the evidence, testimony, or statements of persons; providing and authenticating documents, records, and articles of evidence; locating or identifying persons or items; serving documents; transferring persons in custody temporarily for testimony or other assistance under the Treaty; executing requests for searches and seizures; and identifying, tracing, immobilizing, seizing, and forfeiting assets and assisting in related proceedings.

     I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

                              JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

    January 14, 2025.

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